

# Efforts in Combatting Corruption in Indonesia

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**Efforts in Combating Corruption in Indonesia; A Sociology of Law Perspective**

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**ABSTRACT**

Corruption has become a national disaster for the people of Indonesia during the last several decades. It pervades daily life. Efforts to combat corruption are not simple. This paper begins with a general overview of corruption in Indonesia. The second part, presents a more detailed look at the current state of corruption. Third, examine the present governing institutions such as the courts, police, political parties, and legislative bodies. The findings show that these institutions have been of very little use in combating corruption. Finally, I will focus on efforts to combat corruption from a sociology of law perspective. Any efforts to combat corruption should encourage deep structural and cultural change, as well as address symptomatic problems. Greater media freedom and an increase in civil servant's wages should be made in order to eradicate corruption.

Key Words: corruption, Indonesia, constructionist, sociology of law perspective

**1. INTRODUCTION**

Corruption, known as a KKN (the acronym for corruption, collusion, and nepotism) in the Indonesian language, is a national disease that infects the Indonesian state apparatus at all levels. Corruption, simply defined as “the use of public office for private gain in ways that contravene declared rules,” remains endemic in Indonesia [<sup>i</sup>]. According to the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd (PERC) based in Hong Kong, Indonesia is the most corrupt country in the world [<sup>ii</sup>]. Transparency International listed Indonesia among the top ten most corrupt countries in the world in its survey [<sup>iii</sup>],

There has been little concrete progress in eradicating corruption since the fall of Suharto in May 1998, in spite of promises made by successive presidents. In its Country Assistance Strategy for Indonesia, the World Bank observed that “corruption is still rampant and infects the very institutions (the police, judiciary and legislative) that are supposed to tackle it.” [<sup>iv</sup>]

The short presidential tenure of Suharto successors have been tainted by corruption scandals relating to the illicit mobilization of political funds. Moreover, many other powerful people have been implicated in high profile corruption scandals, including officials in the ruling party, Golkar, its parliamentary members and former president Megawati's party [<sup>v</sup>]

These facts are best shown by the great deal of public resentment and very real anger displayed in many sectors of society at the depredations of Suharto's rule, and his successors, which are seen as

allowing the illicit generation of enormous amounts of wealth for their family members and cronies, A sense of injustice clearly arises in public discussions today when this wealth is contrasted to the poverty that still prevails, especially in contrast with the frequently egalitarian rhetoric of the New Order and successive reforms. Economic hardships have been compounded by natural disasters and the oil crisis. In fact, Indonesia Corruption Watch has suggested that KKN was responsible for the gravity of the economic crisis in Indonesia. The eradication of corruption would help lead to recovery. Mr. Yodhoyono, the new President, has been elected directly by the people and has made combating corruption a priority {<sup>vi</sup>}.

## 2. THE PRESENT STATE OF CORRUPTION

During the Suharto era (1965-1997), the late Indonesia economist Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo suggested that as much as 30 percent of the national budget “evaporated” through corruption{<sup>vii</sup>}, Transparency Intemational's Corruption Perception Index for Indonesia has shown scores that rise and fall over time (figure 1.). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the polls on which the index is based merely record “perception,” and in no way capture the “actual” levels of corruption from year to year. In fact, perceptions and reality may not correlate at all (<sup>viii</sup>).



Source: Transparency International.

From anecdotal sources the impression is that corruption has decreased in recent years, and one must take into account the current levels of public scrutiny and open discussion, and the unpredictability that can result when power become decentralized. For example, a foreign investor with no experience dealing with Indonesia might now be especially perplexed: there is little consensus about whether local autonomy laws require investors to seek permission to invest from the central government in Jakarta, from the governor, or from the local regent. In practical terms this probably means that the investor has to provide bribes to various people at different levels of Indonesia's notoriously cumbersome bureaucracy, with relatively little guarantee that the bribes are reaching the right people, Nevertheless,

some observers cite data that might suggest an improved situation. The new government has recently declared that it has the will to fight corruption. With the inauguration of a new cabinet in December 2004, the president promised to directly lead the campaign against corruption, The president issued President Instruction (Inpres) Number 5, 2005, which sought to hasten the

eradication of corruption. This instruction contains: Every executive under the president should report their wealth to the Corruption Eradication Commission; Improvement of public services and the erasing of illegal retribution; Cooperation with the Corruption Eradication Commission to improve monitoring and control of the budget; the Minister of Justice must enact laws concerning corruption eradication as soon as possible; Chief of National Police and General Attorney must maximize their efforts in handling corruption, punishment, return embezzled state funds, and punish guilty subordinates. The president also promised to punish anybody who creates obstacles for foreign investors, especially for investment permission <sup>(ix)</sup>. He also sought to reassure foreign investors by emphasized the increased political and economic stability, expanding multi-cultural conditions, a better investment climate, and stricter law enforcement <sup>[x]</sup>.

### **3. GOVERNANCE**

Good governance, which includes ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption,<sup>{xi}</sup> remains a distant dream in Indonesia. The political, economic, and social institutions inherited from the Suharto era were so highly corrupted that various reforms have thus yielded only very limited results. Given the vested interests in these institutions, the legacy of the Suharto (New Order) era will likely remain with Indonesia for a long time. In relation to corruption, I will present a brief discussion of key institutions such as the courts, the police, political parties and parliaments, which are increasingly important to governance.

#### **a. The Courts**

The Indonesian court system is regarded as corrupt and therefore of very little use in combating corruption. The selling and buying of court decisions is reported to be a pervasive problem <sup>[xii]</sup>. For example, although much hope was placed initially in the country's newly established commercial courts, Abe courts' performance in determining-corruption has been disappointing. The government has lost almost every case of bad debts it has pursued <sup>[xiii]</sup>. Unfortunately, lately, people accused of corruption are now paying academics for testify on their behalf <sup>(xiv)</sup>. This is very bad for the eradication of corruption. According to Professor Muladi, a criminal law expert at the University of Diponegoro, some professors are posing as experts in corruption cases and are getting paid for manipulating science and redirecting the truth <sup>[xv]</sup>. Such experiences have led the public to view the courts with even less respect. It is hard to convince the general public that the court system will deliver impartial justice in cases of alleged corruption by ex-president Suharto, his family, other high-ranking officials, and his successors.

Judges are relatively underpaid for the power they wield. For example, a newly appointed judge earns only about Rp 2,150,000 a month (US\$210). Therefore, from the beginning of his or her career, a judge has great incentive to engage in corrupt practices, at the very least to offset the initial investment involved in embarking on that career choice. According to various accounts, to pass a test necessary for a judicial appointment a prospective judge must hand out relatively large bribes. Further complicating matters, prosecutors (a profession also tarnished badly by allegations of corruption) engage in similar practices <sup>(xvi)</sup>.

Various reforms have been pursued recently to repair the justice system. There have been attempts particularly to reform the Supreme Court and the Court in Jakarta by mass reassignment. \_ Former President Wahid (1999-2001) was embroiled in a long stand-off with

parliament because of his displeasure with the legislative body's nominees for chief and deputy chief justice, There have been calls for a complete overhaul of the Supreme Court through the replacement of career judges by legal professionals untainted by allegations of corruption [<sup>xvii</sup>]. Indeed, about half of the parliamentary nominees for the Supreme Court in 2000 were not career judges. A rare example of the Court system's efforts at reform took place in June 2003 when the Supreme Court found eleven judges guilty of receiving bribes. The guilty judges were fired [<sup>xviii</sup>].

In order to monitor the conduct of all justices including district justices, high justices, Supreme Court Justices and Constitutional Court Justices, President Yudhoyono inaugurated seven members to the judicial commission (<sup>xix</sup>). Theoretically, the tasks of the judicial commission are not only to monitor those justices but also to select Supreme Court Justices. The judicial commission is also charged with ensuring the integrity of judges. Moreover, the judicial commission not only has the power to promote and give rewards to prestigious justices but also has the power to punish corrupt judges.

#### **b, The Police Force**

The police force has been independent of the armed forces since 2000 in order to strengthen its nonmilitary nature and functions. Like the courts, the police force suffers from a lack of credibility in the eyes of the public, Widespread corruption involving the provision of driving licenses, traffic violations, illegal logging, and crimes like robbery and theft are reported to be prevalent among police officers, and members of the public frequently choose not to report crime because they fear extortion by the police.

The main problem is, again, chronically low salaries, especially in contrast with ever-conspicuous middle and upper-class consumption, But even in recognizing this, it is clear that another aspect is that police officers can get away with these practices. In other words, nobody effectively polices the police. Thus, like the judiciary, the police forces so far have not been an effective tool in the fight against corruption. Indeed, police officers are allegedly break the law with impunity. For example, some policemen themselves recently reported that police personnel receive bribes to turn a blind eye to the lucrative illegal gambling industry, gangsters, and prostitution [<sup>xx</sup>].

The illegal gambling industry is not present only in Jakarta, but also in many other large and small cities where gangsters with links to powerful local bureaucrats or to police and military personnel freely practice their trade. In Medan, for example, gangsters determine who will be appointed the chief of police in the North Sumatra province and for how long. They also determine who will be the commander of the regional army. A systematic investigation into the problem probably would implicate a considerable number of police officers. Again, the perceived susceptibility of police force

members to bribery does not help the institution eradicate corruption. Moreover, a former Jakarta Chief of police was implicated in a case involving the illegal import of luxury automobiles [<sup>xxi</sup>]. There are 40 high-ranking and middle-ranking police officers not eligible for their positions now (<sup>xxii</sup>). These high-ranking police officers misused their position in the last four years by taking bribes, assisting the gambling and narcotic industries, and halting investigations. Joining or a promotion within the police force is very scary. For example, to be accepted in the police force, an applicant must hand out relatively large bribes. In order to be promoted to the chief of

provincial police, a candidate must hand out large bribes <sup>(xxiii)</sup>. The public views the police with little respect because the police hurt the society for the sake of rank, position, and money <sup>(xxiv)</sup>.

### **c. Political Parties and Parliaments**

Political parties are understood to be the vehicles through which the aspirations and interest of the general public are aggregated and articulated. During the Suharto era, political party life was highly constrained, with only three parties allowed to exist and Golkar dominating heavily controlled elections. The fall of Suharto was followed by the quick relaxation of those laws and there were high public expectations about the role of political parties and the advance of a democratic system with greater transparency, the rule of law, and accountability.

The major parties are inhabited by a large number of people whose careers were nurtured within the New Order system of patronage. These include former bureaucrats, ex-Golkar officials, retired military and police officers, as well as political and business entrepreneurs. The major political parties are widely believed to be uniformly involved in the pervasive practice of money politics, down to the local level <sup>(xxv)</sup>. Though existing political laws govern the process of receiving contributions, they have been very poorly enforced, and the required campaign auditing results have not been made public.

The Indonesia Corruption Watch, as well as the press, reports that national parliamentarians of all parties regularly receive bribes from government bodies and the private sector for voting a particular way on various bills <sup>[xxvi]</sup>. Moreover, certain parliamentary commissions that deal with finance and development are widely regarded as being particularly lucrative or “wet.” Local parliaments follow the pattern of money politics and corruption of the national parliament; national legislators even cooperate with the central government to sell off state property. These patterns are increasingly regarded as a problem because central state authority has now diminished a situation that has been more or less codified by the promulgation of local autonomy laws, although these laws remained contested <sup>(xxvii)</sup>.

In fact, the national parliament and local parliaments are considered to be more lucrative than others. In the election of governors, head of regions and majors in Indonesia, some parliamentarians admitted to being bribed to cast their votes for certain winning candidates. This situation has been changed by direct elections from this year (2005). Corruption at local levels needs to be the focus of more attention by the government and non-governmental accountability institutions. Unfortunately, most of the better-equipped accountability institutions are based in Jakarta, and it is especially important to monitor developments in economically significant regions such as industrial centers and the resource-rich provinces.

## **4. EFFORTS IN COMBATING CORRUPTION FROM A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW PERSPECTIVE**

Most Indonesian citizens are deeply concerned about corruption. Corruption is now recognized as perhaps the most challenging governance problem afflicting the newly elected president and his cabinet in Indonesia. The growing condemnation of corrupt activities is a seismic shift in the national mood. Many practices once regarded as business as usual are now regarded as corruption. The arrests of high-ranking government officials such as Head of General Election Commission (hereinafter is called KPU), 2 former minister, the director of state-owned bank by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Attorney General and Investigation

Team for the Eradication of Corruption (TimTasTipikor) helped catalyze changes in the perception of corruption. As a result, public awareness about the corrosive effects of corruption is at an all-time high and corruption is invariably among the top problems cited in Indonesia.

On an economic level, corruption is seen as a contributing factor to the Indonesian financial\_srisis which began in 1997. The economic crisis has focused people's attention on the staggering impact of corruption in Indonesia. The interlocking relationship of business and government were previously viewed as part of the way of doing business, and crucial to strategic policy-making.

On a political level, corruption has risen in recent years in the national agenda because of its role in political development. At one point, in the first direct president election (2004), the President Megawati was defeated by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono because the people were disgusted by the corruption of the previous government [xxviii].

Although Indonesia is facing corruption as a major national issue, its causes, patterns, and consequences are highly specific. Differences in political and legal institutions, levels of economic development, and social values mean differences in how corruption is dealt with. For instance, all things being equal, a country that has an independent judiciary is more likely to be able to succeed in combating corruption than a country that is weak in the rule of law. In the following section, I will discuss efforts in combating corruption from sociology of law perspective, such as policies and institutions, anti-corruption coalitions, leadership and management, welfare, culture and social construction.

#### **a. Anti-corruption Policies and Institutions**

Combating corruption has officially been high on the agenda of presidents elected since Suharto fell. Indeed, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Decree No. 11/1998 produced during the first post-Suharto session calls for "state administration that is clean and free corruption, collusion and nepotism." It also affirms that no past or present state officials, or members of their families, will be above the law. With the enforcement of Law No. 31/999, which superseded the Law No. 3, 1971 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, the act of corruption has been constituted as a criminal act. The Law No. 3, 1971 established that criminal procedures act as the tool to enforce the law against corruption and enables the prosecutors to investigate, indict and prosecute corruption. Even though corruption has been a criminal act, and the means to prosecute and enforce available since 1971, corruption has flourished (xxix).

The government has sought to pursue a number of anti-corruption measures to improve governance in the judiciary, civil service, corporate sector, legislative and executive branch. Still the government realizes that there are a lot of shortcomings in combating corruption and other criminal cases and that corruption has been rampant in all state institutions since the New Order era [xxx].

Some of the tools necessary to eradicate are already in place in Indonesia. For example, new systems are now in place to promote transparency through disclosure and the monitoring of personal assets. But other tools are still absent such as integrity in public service. That lack was demonstrated in the earlier discussion of some of the governance institutions. Likewise, as I have pointed out, judges, prosecutors and police personnel are not properly compensated for their

work, as they should be, Bribery remains an important means of attaining a position, whether as a bureaucrat or an elected official. Moreover, bribery rather than transparent criteria is seen to be an important in promotions and placement to obtain higher positions for many individual civil servants.

Other tools that are largely absent are anti-bribery actions and the promotion of integrity in business operations. Bribing officials is widely perceived as crucial to ensuring the successful operations of business. However, the decentralization of power has created some confusion in the business community. This is a major problem for foreign and domestic investors in figuring out “the right” individuals and officers to bribes. ‘This creates high costs for the economy [xxxii)].

The most obviously present tool is the growing prominence of the public in combating corruption, at least as represented by independent, civil society based accountability institutions. Public involvement is assisted by a free press. Although there are limits to what the accountability institutions can achieve in the current environment, they have been instrumental in widening access to information and mobilizing public pressure.

A number of government bodies have been created to deal with corruption in Indonesia lately. The following are profiles of the most important agencies that are charged with combating corruption.

(1) The Supreme Audit Board

According to a Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly and the 1945 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia, the Supreme Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK),<sup>[xxxii]</sup> is a high state institution that is supposed to be independent from the influence and power of the government, yet is not superior to the government. One of the tasks of BPK is to examine the management and accountability of state finances. The results of any examination of state finances must be submitted to the House of Representatives, the Regional Representative Council or the House of Representatives in line with their respective authority. Action based on the results of any such examination should be taken by respective institutions and/or bodies according to the law. In the Suharto era, the BPK was not free and independent from the influence and power of the government. Now, the BPK is mostly concerned with examining expenditures of the national budget and it audits the books of government ministries and other institutions. Its findings are conveyed to the parliament. The BPK also advises the government when it uncovers criminal acts related to state finances. With the revision of the 1945 Constitution, the BPK members are chosen by the House of Representatives, which take into regard the recommendations of regional Representative Council, and are appointed by the President. The BPK’s chair is elected by and from its members."

The BPK has been proactive, periodically announcing its findings that reveal disturbingly high levels of financial irregularities in state institutions. One of the most famous cases is the General Election Commission case, One of the members of General Election Commission was caught red-handed while trying to give a bribe to one of the auditors of the BPK. The more open political environment has clearly encouraged such proactive behavior.

(2) National Ombudsman Commission (Komisi Ombudsman Nasional).

This is a state institution authorized to monitor and examine public complaints about the administration of the state and the provision of public services. It was established on the basis of



a presidential decision in 2000. The aim of this institution is to increase the level of public participation in eradicating corruption. Theoretically, it has the authority to investigate irregularities found in the administration of state. The commission consists of 11 members, including prominent legal experts and a few activists, Unfortunately, this commission is not known by the public for its role in eradicating corruption.

### (3) Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre

The Indonesian Financial Transaction Report and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) was created by Law No. 15 of 2002 on Money Laundering, In general, INTRAC is an effort by Indonesia to participate with other countries to eradicate the criminal act of money laundering [}. Nationally, INTRAC helps law enforcement fight not only money laundering and terrorist funding but also fight other serious criminal acts that produce money or require extensive funding.

Prior to actual of INTRAC, on October 18, 2003, the power and authority to analyze and investigate suspected financial transactions in the banking sector was carried out by a special investigation unit of the Bank of Indonesia [xxxiii]. Based on President Decree Number 83 of 2003 concerning the use of power of the INTRAC, this institution can extend its authority to other sectors including property.

In fact, few banks and other financial services report transactions to the INTRAC [xxxiv]. In March 2004, of 138 banks only 36 banks and-only one loan company and two security companies reported suspect transactions to INTRAC. INTRAC has had limited success in it efforts.

On July 26, 2005, the Head of INTRAC, the Head of KPK, and the Chief of National Police met. In the meeting, the Head of INTRAC submitted an analysis from some reports received by INTRAC [xxxv]. According to the report, 15 high ranking police officers and middle ranking police officers had suspect private bank accounts or irregular sums of money [xxxvi], According to David Ridwan Betz, Director Executive State Apparatus Monitoring Independent Alliance (Ampika), one high ranking police officer had a sum of Rp800 billion in his bank account [xxxvii]. He stressed that 300 high ranking police officers had suspect bank accounts. In order to avoid a conflict of interest with the police institutions, most anti-corruption organization and some former high ranking police officers urged the Chief of National Police of Republic of Indonesia to hand over the cases to the KPK [xxxviii], Mr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, the Chairman of People Consultative Assembly wamed the Chief of National Police of Republic Indonesia to act on the INTRAC findings within a week. In line with the Chairman of People Consultative Assembly, Mr. Saifuddin, a member of parliament of Commission II] (Law field), stressed that the case should be proceed as soon as possible, otherwise the credibility of National Police would further deteriorate (xxxix).

### (4) Corruption Eradication Commission

The Corruption Eradication Commission (hereinafter is called KPK) is a state agency empowered to perform its duties and exercise its authority independently, free from any and all influence. The KPK is a new institution established by the Law No. 30, 2002. The KPK was formed with the primary purpose of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to eradicate criminal acts of corruption [xxxx}, The KPK theoretically is tasked with the following duties: to coordinate with institutions authorized to eradicate corruption; to supervise institutions

authorized to eradicate corruption; to conduct investigations, indictments, and prosecutions against corrupt acts; to conduct preventive actions against corrupt acts; and to monitor state governance. In performing its duties of coordination, the KPK is authorized to: coordinate investigations, indictments, and prosecutions against criminal acts of corruption; implement a reporting system for the purposes of eradicating corruption; request information on acts with the purpose of eradicating corruption from relevant institutions; arrange opinion hearings and meetings with institutions authorized to eradicate corruption; and request reports from relevant institutions pertaining to the prevention of criminal acts of corruption [xxxxxi]

The KPK, whose members are nominated by parliament, consists of five people. The KPK is held responsible to the public to perform its duties. The KPK is also obliged to convey reports transparently and regularly to the President, the Parliament, and the Supreme State Auditor.

The KPK has showed success in its efforts. On June 29, 2004, Mr. Abdullah Puteh, the Governor of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam was indicted for corruption of helicopter funds (which involved Rp 4.1 billion of embezzled state funds). The KPK prosecutor arrested Mr. Puteh at Salemba Prison in Jakarta on December 7, 2004 [xxxixii]. A panel of judges headed by Justice Kresna Menon decided to sentence him to 10 years in prison. He was also ordered to pay a fine of Rp500 millions or serve six months in prison. He also has to reimburse the State for the sum of Rp 3, 87 billion or serve one year in prison.

On April 9, 2005, the KPK arrested Mulyana, a member of the General Elections Commission on charges of trying to bribe one of the auditors of Supreme Auditor Board [xxxixiii]. This case is very spectacular and made the public, especially the activists and non-government organizations gloomy because Mulyana was one of the leading activists against corruption and a lecturer of criminal justice at the University of Indonesia. A panel of judges headed by Justice Masrudin Chaniago decided to sentence him 2 years 7 months in prison. He was also ordered to pay a fine of Rp50 millions or serve three months in prison [xxxixiv].

The following month, May 20, 2005, the KPK arrested Nazaruddin Syamsudin, the Head of the General Elections Commission on charges of corruption [xxxixv]. Mr. Syamsudin is a professor of political science at University of Indonesia, one of the leading universities in the country.

Mr. Rusadi Kantaprawira, another member of the National Elections Commission, was arrested by the KPK on July 18, 2005, on charges of corruption followed by the former Secretary General of the General Elections Commission. Mr. Kantaprawira is a professor of political science at University of Padjajaran, another leading university [xxxixvi]. Other high ranking officers of the General Elections Commission were arrested by the KPK. In connection with the General Elections Commission, officers at the Budget Directorate, Minister of Finance have been arrested.

The KPK is also investigating corruption at the Radio Republic of Indonesia. Some directors have been arrested. On August 9, 2005, the Director of Administration and Finance was arrested on corruption charges related to the embezzlement of Rp2 billion [xxxixvii]. The KPK's investigation and arrests are only the starting point in combating corruption, but they will also deter corruption.

(5) Team for the Eradication of Corruption

The team for the Eradication of Corruption, or TimTasTipikor was established on May 6, 2005, with Presidential Decree Number 11, 2005 [ TimTasTipikor was established in response to a call for more proactive governmental efforts to eradicate corruption. -TimTasTipikor consists of 48 members. Widely respected and clean prosecutors, police officers, and member of the Supreme Audit Board were appointed to this team. The team was initially bolstered by presidential policy: the enemies are bad governance, bad management, inefficiency and corruption [xxxxviii].

TimTasTipikor is designed as an interim body to investigate alleged corruption. In May 2005, the president gave the Head of TimTasTipikor 16 documents that alleged corruption in government institutions. The extent of fraud was from Rp50 billion to Rp 2,1 trillion. The president told to Head of TimTasTipikdr, to eradicate corruption even it if effects economic, and national stability [xxxxix]. The president has guaranteed that nobody can intervene in the fight against corruption.

The TimTasTipikor had spectacular success in its efforts. On June 23, 2005, the TimTasTipikor arrested Mr. Sayyid Aqil Husien sl-Munawwar, former Minister of Religion of Republic of Indonesia on charges of corruption [xxxxx]. Prior to the arrest, the TimTasTipikor had arrested the office's director genera! and secretary general. The following month, July 11, the team arrested Mr. Ahmad Djunaidi, President Director of Labor Insurance Company (a state-owned company) on yoe charges of corruption (xxxxi); Unfortunately, the TimTasTipikor is internally divided about {lié Stite Electric Company case [xxxxii]. Some of the investigators think that there are three or five suspectsincluding high-ranking officers in the Ministry of State Owned Companies, Other investigators stated that all the officers who receive the bonus are suspects. Seventeen people, including the chairman and member of commission board, received bonuses [xxxxiii].

#### **b. Anti-corruption Coalition .**

With the fall of the authoritarian New Order and the rise of democracy and political and press freedoms, there has been a notable increase in civil society-based initiatives to monitor and help eradicate corruption in Indonesia. Civil society-based accountability organizations and their spokespeople regularly criticize the government for its slow handling of corruption cases and increase public awareness of these cases. The new president is open to criticism and actively fights corruption. Here are some of the more important independent accountability institutions:

##### **(1) Indonesian Corruption Watch**

The Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) is a high profile organization established on June 21, 1998, just a month after the fall of Suharto, by group of disparate individuals with reputations for being critical of the Suharto regime. The organization was clearly a product of the reform movement that aspired toward a clean government, "free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism." One member of this organization is Adi Andjoyo respected former judge who headed the Joint Investigation Team for the Eradication of Corruption which came to an end on July 2001 by decision of the Supreme Court. Other members include(d) Bambang Widjayanto, formerly the Head of the Legal Aid Institute, Munir, a human rights activist who was poisoned to dead on a flight from Jakarta to Amsterdam, and Teten Masduki, now the head of this organization (xxxxiv). The initial idea for ICW came from public figures and NGO activists. ICW has been the most publicly vocal and aggressive of the civil society-based anti-corruption

institutions, regularly making press statements and commenting on the state of corruption in Indonesia. Its vision is to develop a strong civil society ' able to check the behavior of corrupt public power brokers and their collaborators in the private sector. ICW conducts research, produces publications, holds seminars, and promotes activities.

The success of ICW in fighting corruption was recognized when Teten Marsudi, the chief of group won the Magsaysay Public Service Award for "challenging Indonesians to expose corruption and claim their right to clean government [xxxxv].

#### (2) Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia and Transparency International, Indonesia Chapter

The Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia or Indonesian Transparency Society (MTI) is a civil society-based organization that sees itself as part of a moral movement to clean the government and the private sector of corrupt practices [xxxxvi]. Some of its tasks are to hold itself responsible for socializing the virtues of transparent practices in all aspects of life and for monitoring public policy. Other tasks are to ensure the public interest. MTI's activities include organizing meetings, conducting research on transparency related issues, and disseminating research to decision makers in business, government, and the public at large.

Transparency International, Indonesia chapter (TI-Indonesia) is an organization affiliated with Berlin-based Transparency International (xxxxvii). It aims to create greater transparency and accountability in the administration of government and business. Like many other accountability institutions, it is involved in compiling and analyzing information related to transparency and in raising public awareness of corruption. TI-Indonesia, like MTI, conducts seminars, workshops, and training sessions. Its supervisory body includes a lawyer, foreign judge, and a noted journalist, and its executive body consists of a mixture of business people, academic, and well-known NGO.

#### (3) Partnership for Governance Reforms

The Partnership for Governance Reforms is a collaborative effort between the international community and Indonesians to promote and support governance reform [xxxxviii]. It brings together the Indonesian government, legislature, judiciary, civil society, the corporate sector, and the international community. The partnership, in existence since 2001, fosters policy dialogue and analysis of governance issues and makes information available to the public on key aspects of governance reforms. It also provides financial assistance to Indonesian agencies active in governance reform efforts. The partnership has carried out various activities in the areas of anti-corruption measures, civil service reform, civil society and media strengthening, corporate governance, electoral reform, legal and judicial reforms, and police/security reform. The coalition combines internal and external champions and is able to back its recommendations for reform with financial support.

#### (4) Local Anti-corruption Watchdogs

There has been a proliferation of local anti-corruption watchdogs in the relatively short period of time since the fall of the New Order era. Some of these have root in older NGO movements; others were responses to the holding of free elections in 1999; and still others were a direct reaction to the increasing importance of local governments in the context of decentralization policies. One of them is a local anti-corruption organization called SORAK,

which actively campaigns against corruption in Aceh Province. SORAK resulted in the arrest of Mr. Puteh, the Governor of Aceh Province this year (xxxxix]. Another group, the Lumbang Informasi Rakyat (LIRA) also known as the Blora Center, reported corruption in the national police. It stressed that in a telecommunication network project for the national police hundreds of billion of rupiah were embezzled. No one linked to the case has been arrested, but the chief of the national police was dismissed on July 8 (L). The limited success of local anti-corruption watchdogs is due to a lack experience, skilled personnel, and financial and other resources.

### **c. Leadership and Management**

The most important issue for institutions and agencies combating corruption is finding people who have the credibility to lead the fight. Most of Indonesian elite are tainted by associations with the New Order regime. Some controversy over Mr. Yudhoyono, the new elected president, because he is considered to less “clean.” He is a product of the general army during New Order era. In his campaign, he stressed anti-corruption. Since he became president, he publicly promised to combat corruption with a one hundred day shock therapy strategy.

The Forum for the Eradication of Corruption (Forum 2004) comprised of members such as Professor Romli Atmasesmita, Professor Muladi, Teten Masduki (head of ICW) and Solahuddin Wahid criticized the government for not taking clear, concrete steps. Professor Romli stresses that President Yudhoyono has failed to mobilize law enforcement and combat corruption in the first one hundred days (LI}, On the other hand, according to Forum 2004, the shock therapy strategy is an appropriate way to restore public confidence in the government (LII) The government should reform the system, stop misuse of power, and enforce the law against those who abuse power.

In response to its critics, the government has taken eight steps to combat corruption: [LIV]

- To combat internal corruption and invite the public to do the same. It means the first step is to clean house of the state secretary institution including its foundation, cabinet secretary, and president and vice president offices;
- To monitor the inventories in all ministry departments;
- To prevent corruption in Aceh's reconstruction project;
- To prevent corruption in infrastructure development during the next five years;
- To investigate corruption in state institutions such as ministries and state- owned companies;
- To pursue offenders who have escaped to foreign countries;
- To prevent illegal logging;
- To investigate tax payers.

To implement these steps, the government, headed by the president, intends to evaluate and find solutions to shortcomings in its efforts to combat corruption [LV)]. In order to support efforts in combating corruption, the president also established some additional institutions such as the KPK, TimTasTipikor and Ad Hoc Justices. This was necessary in part because there is

little public confidence in conventional institutions charged with combating corruption such as the police, prosecutors and judges.

In order to implement these steps, all of the president's assistants such as ministers and governors, regional chiefs, and mayors are able to understand and support these steps. It appears that the president is committed to taking action. It is time for the president to concentrate on the implementation of these steps. The public is concerned that the president's assistants will not be able to carry out all these steps on their own with their ministries, the police, and judicial system. The president's strong commitment should be supported and bolstered by the Supreme Court. Otherwise, accused corruptors will be free from the courts.

#### **d, Compensation for Public Employees**

Improvements have been made in compensation for high state ranking employees such as the president, vice president, minister, supreme judges, and constitution judges, chief of national police, members of parliament, governors, regional heads, and mayors. 'Their take-home pay is enough to support their basic needs, and the cost of living. As well as other secondary needs. In addition, high-ranking state officials receive official residences and automobiles. The take-home pay for the president is around Rp50 million (US\$5000) a month, while the ministers get Rp 20 million (US\$2000). Other high-ranking state officials make from Rp1 million to \$5 million plus various allowances (LVI).

This is not the case for about six million civil servants, 500,000 military personnel and 125,000 police officers in Indonesia. The take-home pay of a grade one civil servant is no more than Rp 500,000 (about US\$52) a month, which is below the minimum provincial wages set for workers in the private sector in Jakarta. The take-home pay of grade four civil servants stands at around Rp2 million (US\$200) without any allowances for homes and automobiles. The government should raise the salaries of low ranking civil servants, military personnel and police officers, as well as senior officials (grade four civil servants) that have no "structural or functional posts."(LVII) The government should recognize the move to increase the salaries of low ranking civil servants as essential as many of them face difficulties in fulfilling their basic needs. Low compensation is the primary factor in encouraging the misuse of power and corruption.

The government planned to increase the salary for grade one and two civil servants, so that their income would increase by up to 30 percent while grade three and four officials would receive a 15 percent increase. First echelon officials, such as ministry director generals, were supposed to get a 7 percent salary increase. But the plan to increase the salaries of top officials drew strong criticism amid the current difficulties bedeviling state finances and the economic hardship,(LVII) so efforts to combat some of the root causes of corruption remained a dream. The government is combating the tip of the iceberg of corruption while most corruption exists under the surface of the water.

#### **f. Culture**

Recent efforts to combat corruption by President Yudhoyono, and the investigation and arrest of alleged corruptors, have made an imprint on Indonesian society in some ways. These actions make Indonesians realize that corruption is not a normal act, corruption is wrong, and

corruption jeopardizes themselves and their country. Many people recognize that corruption should be eradicated from daily life.

Efforts in combating corruption are a sign of progress for President Yudhoyono's government in its first year. They make the public happy, and give hope for a better life, justice and prosperity in the future. Such experiences were absent under previous governments. Despite recent successes and progress, these are still shallow steps in the fight against corruption in Indonesia (LVIII).

Corruption is the result of an inappropriate structure and culture. On structural level, corruption is supported by the long and deep structure of relationships among human beings framed by injustice, abuse of power, and elite advantages. That structural relationship is symbolized by the relation between bureaucracy and society. In this relationship, bureaucrats abuse their power and the public. This structure allows for the abuse of power from low level bureaucrats in the villages to high ranking state officials in the national government.

On a cultural level, corruption is supported with strong, deep impressions and beliefs that it is normal, right, and that everybody does it. This phenomenon can be seen in daily conversations in the villages, small, middle and big cities. In public one can routinely hear comments such as "It was normal for him to engage in corruption because it was hard for him to get the position" often many people appear to forgive corruption by civil servants because their salaries are below the standard of living and the standard of minimum wages of private company employees.

An understanding that corruption is rooted in inappropriate structural and cultural tradition should help to combat corruption. From this point of view, investigating and arresting those suspected of corruption is not enough. Such actions definitely have meaning in combating corruption but they are shallow action and not the only step in combating corruption.

Changes in the structure and culture consist of the following three essential efforts:

- Efforts are needed to fulfill the basic needs of every citizen. Such efforts are needed to change societal behavior from corrupt to just behavior.
- There should be a constant campaign on against corruption, but suspect should be treated with "presumption of innocence." This will have « great effect on the public I communicate that corruption is not normal, but wrong, bad, immoral and impermissible. In the long term these efforts will diminish the deep culture of corruption.
- Equality needs to be achieved between bureaucrats who have the power and societies who do not have the power. The eradication of the abuse of power is the key point in this context. There must be equality before the law.

This relationship should be supported by transparency and accountability. Without these supporting elements, the inappropriate structure and culture will not change. Since corruption has flourished, no aspects of daily life are clean. For example, in government offices, there is no day when a bribe is not exchanged. What is disgusting is that even government offices that oversee religion matters, such as the Pilgrim Program and Churches, are full of corruption. The eradication of corruption requires the strengthening of structures and the culture. Conventional institutions, such as law enforcement institutions, are not able to eradicate corruption.

### **g. Constructionist Perspective**

In this section, I try to identify the factors that institutionalized the problem of corruption in Indonesia. While I intend to make my theoretical framework as general as possible, I shall limit my analysis to a specific field, for example, corruption in government institutions. This seemingly narrow focus can be justified because corruption in government institutions is one of the most serious problems faced by Indonesian society and government.

We cannot expect that a perception of corruption can be institutionalized by efforts of a single person. It requires the collective efforts of many people. Corruption problems are a part of a larger political and economic interest regime, and the collective efforts and activities that seek to alter the regime may require a social construction approach to the corruption problems. Social constructionist focuses on the social, political and cultural processes by which corruption is defined as being unacceptable, immoral, risky and therefore unacceptable. The debate about corruption reflects the absence of certainty about law and justice, and the existence of contradictory certainty. Contradictory certainty consists of severely divergent and mutually irreconcilable sets of convictions both about the impact of corruption and the solutions that available.

In addition, the social constructionist framework recognizes the extent to which corruption and solutions are the end product of dynamic social process of definition, negotiation and legitimization both in public and private settings (LIX). The social constructionist approach grounds the study of corruption in a distinctly sociological paradigm. Conceptualized this way, we may draw out there sociology of social constructionist approach to drive our basic analytical framework. Constructionism is not only helpful as a theoretical stance but it can also be useful as an analytic tool. In this regard, Best suggests three primary foci for studying social problems from a social constructionist perspective: the claims themselves, the claims-makers, and the claims-making process (LX).

According to Best, there are several key questions to be considered when analyzing the content of claim (LXI). What is being said about the problem? How is the problem being typified? What is the rhetoric of claim-making and how are claims presented so as to persuade their audience? Best analyses the content of social problem claims by focusing on the “rhetoric” of claim-making. Rhetoric involves the deliberate use of language in order to persuade. Rhetorical statements contain three principal components or categories of Grounds or data furnish the basic facts, which shape the ensuing claims-making discourse. There are three main types of ground statements: definition, examples and numeric estimates. Definitions set the boundaries or domain of the problem and give it an orientation; that is, a guide to how we interpret it. Examples make it easier for public bodies to identify with the people affected by the problem, especially where they are perceived as helpless victims. By estimating the magnitude of the problem, claims-makers establish its importance; its potential for growth and its range, often to “epidemic” proportions.

Warrants are justification for demanding that action be taken. These include presenting the impact, describing victim as blameless or innocent, emphasizing links with history or linking the claims to basic rights and freedoms. Some of the questions that could be addressed about are that the claim such as abuse of power is morally wrong, risky and dangerous, Corruption is very dangerous for human beings and nations. Corruption jeopardizes the economy, political, law,



justice, prosperity, democracy and country. The country is an inheritance from our ancestors and it is our responsibility to pass it to future generations.

Conclusions spell out the action, which is needed to alleviate or eradicate corruption. This frequently entails the formulation of new social control policies by existing bureaucratic institutions or the creation of new extraordinary agencies, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and Team for the Eradication of Corruption (TimTasTipikor), to carry out these policies. When examining the identity of claims-makers, Best advises that we pose a number of questions [LXII]. Are claims-makers affiliated to specific organizations, social movements, profession of interest groups? Do they\*represent their own interests or those of third parties? Are they experienced or novices?

Many studies, which have been undertaken in the social constructionist mode, have pointed to the important role played by professionals and scientists in constructing corruption problem claims. Others have noted the importance of policy or issue entrepreneur politicians, public interest law firms, civil servants and activists whose careers are dependent upon creating new opportunities, programs and sources of funding. Claim-makers may also reside in the mass media, especially since the manufacture of news depends upon journalists, editors and producers.

Best poses-a-number of useful questions about the claims-making process.' Who the claim-maker's address? Where other claims-makers presenting rival claims? What concerns and interests did the claims-maker's audience bring to the issue, and how did these issue shape the audiences response to the claims? How did the nature of the claims or the identity of the claims-makers affect the audience response? Corruption among police, prosecutors, parliaments, and government institutions, which probably owes more to the changing moral landscape of bureaucrats and non- bureaucrats relationship, are tied more directly to evidence and claims [LXIII], Corruption requires a more imposing physical evidence basis to become social problem, which are more rooted in personal troubles that become converted into public issues.

American sociologists James Coleman and Donald Cressey briefly illustrate the constructionist definition of social problems by noting "corruption did not become a social problem until anti-corruption activists were able to convince others to show concern about conditions that actually existed for some time"[LXIV]. However, if thousands of people in Indonesia did not know they were being poisoned by the inappropriate use of power by bureaucrats, bribery, wages under the standard of living, wouldn't corruption still be a social problem?

Since corruption is a pressing concern, I believe that a social constructionist analysis is worthwhile. In fact, this study illuminates the challenge that faced any government institution. [I also expect that my hypothesis will have wider application, even though different situations will probably require different set of variables, I expect that factors have an impact on corruption in one direction in a certain situation will produce effects in the same way in other settings. Here, we only need to pay attention to the possibility that the absolute levels of achievement will differ from one country to another, depending on the interaction of those basic factors and the characteristics of a specific situation.

With this framework as s backdrop, I will now look at the efforts in combating corruption in Indonesia. Indeed, we may derive even from rough descriptions some suggestions about the relationship between corruption and factors, such as assembling and presenting of corruption risk

claims. If our theory is to explain the outcomes of the social constructionist framework for the danger of corruption, it should certainly be able to explain the impact of corruption.

In defining corruption risks, bringing them to society's attention and provoking action, claim-makers must engage in a variety of activities. Some of these are centrally concerned with the collective necessary to improve the law, law enforcement and standard of living of officials. This is not to say that the element of definition and action are not constantly interrelated. Nevertheless, corruption eradication does follow a certain temporal order of development as it progresses from initial discovery to law enforcement. .

I draw upon two models, and three processes through which a public arena is built around the corruption problem and three tasks that are necessary for the corruption issue to originate, develop and grow powerful within the political system [LXV]. Borrowing from Susskind, in considering the construction of corruption, it is possible to identify three key tasks: assembling, presenting and contesting claims (See chart .1).

The task of assembling the corruption claims concern initial discovery and the elaboration of the impact of corruption. At this stage, it is necessary to engage in a variety of specific activities: naming corruption and its impact, distinguishing it from other similar or more encompassing good governance, determining the act of corruption, the moral or legal basis of the claim and gauging who is responsible. Corruption problem frequently originate in the realm of chance, power, regulation and morals. One reason for this is that ordinary people have neither the consciousness nor the resource to recognize the impact of corruption.

Some corruption problems however, do relate more closely to daily life. Concern over bribery frequently begins with people who seek the services of a government institution; People come to draw a causal link between the impact of corruption practices and perceived economic crisis, poverty and increases in the cost of production. In addition, corruption impacts public confidence, For example, it decreases trust in the police, prosecutors, courts, and government officials.

Those whose jobs or moral pursuits bring them into close contact to anti-corruption efforts on a daily basis (religious people, religion organizations, the mass media, clean police officers, anticorruption students, non-government organizations, politicians, professors and residents) may also be the initial source of claims, They notice early signs of corruption such as suspect bank accounts of high-ranking police officers, or corruption at the Ministry of Religion and KPU.

In researching the origin of corruption claims, it is important for us to ask where claims come from, who owns or manages them, what economic and political interests the claims-maker represents and what resources they bring to the claim-making process. In the Ministry of Religion case, the claims came from the people who participated in the Hajj program. In the KPU case, the claims came from people who could not run as presidential candidates.

Today, corruption claims-makers are more likely to take the form of the mass media, or professional social movements with paid administrative and research staff, and sophisticated fund raising. Some groups even use the Internet and maintain an updated + homepage, as do the ICW, TI, Indonesia, MTI, and Partnership for Governance Reform Campaigns are planned in advance, often in pseudo-military fashion. Grassroots participation is not encouraged beyond

“paper memberships” with control centralized in the hands of a core group of full time activists. Anti-corruption coalition organizations, universities and research centers carry out campaigns and seminars to urge the government to investigate, arrest, and punish corruption.

The process of assembling corruption claims often involves a rough division of labor. While there are notable exceptions, research scientists are normally handicapped by a combination of scholarly caution, excessive use of technical jargon, and an inexperienced in handling the media. Indeed, the nature of reaction between the news media and government institutions and non-government organizations such as KPK, TimTasTipikor, ICW, TI-Indonesia, MTI and The Blora Center has been sufficiently institutionalized. [It would be difficult for corruption cases to penetrate the mass media arena without at least validation from them.

In assembling corruption claims, the concept should be easily understood by the society. Sometimes, the basic claim only becomes clear in the context of a political, or an economic crisis. In presenting the inappropriate use of power and state funds by non-government organizations, claims-makers have a dual mandate: they need both to command attention and legitimize their claim [LXV]. To command attention, the potential corruption must be seen to be as novel, important and understandable, the same values which characterize news selection in general [LXVI].

One of the effective ways of commanding attention is through the claimant's use of graphic, evocative verbal, visual imagery such as song, poems, books and homepages. Thus, the media's extreme photographic coverage of the arrest of former ministers, members of the General Election Commission, and other high-ranking state officers on corruption charges, had great impact not only across Indonesia but also the world. Visual language can be particularly powerful in carrying of this task. For example, Mr. Syamsudin, and Rusadi Kantaprawira, respected professors-and Mulyana clean activists lost relevance when the mass media released the photo and news about their arrest.

It is not unusual, however, for these visual images to be streamlined so as to underline a central image. On April 10, 2005, most of the national and local newspaper articles were accompanied by television news about the arrest of Mr Mulyana. The activists were shocked upon hearing the news. Corruption may be forced into prominence when exemplified by particular cases, for example, at the ministry of religion, the state electric company, the state-owned banks, the state labor insurance agency, governors, regional heads, mayors, members of parliament, police and judiciary, Some dramatic-events like these are important because they determine the political identification of an issue, the situations out of which it emerges, its causes and effects, the identity of the activities and the group in the society which are involved with the issue (LXVII).

A corruption event become prominent when it 1) stimulates media attention; 2) involves some arm of the government; 3) demands governmental will and decision; 4) is not regarded by the public as a freak, one-time occurrence; and 5) relates to the personal interest of significant number of citizens. These criteria are partly 2 function of the incident itself but also depend on the successful exploitation of an event by the non-government organizations and government institutions which combat corruption.

In presenting claims, anti-corruption coalitions, government organizations and religious group leaders such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah engage in the process of “frame

alignment.” For example, religious group leaders tap into and manipulate existing public concern in order to broaden their appeal. President claims to establish two additional institutions to eradicate corruption, the religious leaders establish anti-corruption movements, and non-government organizations actively monitor and report corruption. They also encourage the public to participate in anti-corruption seminars, research and workshops.

Commanding attention is not sufficient, however to get a new issue on the agenda for public debate [LXVII]. Rather emergent anti-corruption efforts must be legitimated in multiple arenas such as the media, government, science, law, democracy and the public. In Indonesia, in particular they must be legitimated by the media, government, academics and the public.

There are two ways to achieve legitimacy. One is by using rhetorical tactics [LXIX]. Bests suggests that anti-corruption rhetoric has become increasingly polarized. The religious organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have tended to adopt a “rhetoric of rectitude,” which condemns corruption on strictly moral grounds. This cleavage can be illustrated with reference to the police, prosecutor, court, parliament, and government that have lost their function to eradicate corruption and the destruction of these institutions is morally wrong. By contrast, anti-corruption coalitions, who advocate ‘sundry version of the danger of corruption’ paradigm, tend toward a rhetoric of rationality. Clean governance, for example, is based on the premise that the country can be both socially just and prosperous.

Second, corruption claims can also be legitimated when their sponsor becomes legitimate and a source of information for authorities. The BPK, INTRAC, ICW, Blora Center and Local Anticorruption Watchdog have achieved this kind of sustained success as claim-makers.

However, the findings and testimony by themselves are not always sufficient to legitimate a corruption case. In the case of corruption in Indonesia, earlier complaints and testimony by Indonesia economist, Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo, suggested that as much as 30 percent of the national budget “evaporated” through corruption [LXIX]. Jeffrey Winters, a U.S. based Indonesia specialist, even suggested in 1997 that 30 percent of World Bank aid to Indonesia had been misappropriated in one year (“International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), a consortium of NGOs, supported this allegation but it was denied by the World Bank representative in Jakarta. It was only later legitimated when it was linked to claims that corruption destroyed the economy, morality, the rule of law and democracy. By making this linkage during the presidential election, Mr. Yudhoyono defeated his opponent, and gained wide attention and media legitimacy.

In contesting claims of corruption, one can interpret the corruption issue from the position that religious organizations and anti-corruption coalition movement have been far more successful on broad political agenda than in getting their policies institutionalized within this agenda. Especially where these policies might require the reallocation of resources away from large scale capital interests and national and local bureaucratic actors such as in the capital city of Jakarta.

There are factors, which can contribute to the corruption issue in Indonesia being lost at the point of decision or action. Major external constraints such as the onset national and local conflicts may lead to the corruption issue being postponed, than altogether abandoned. Concern about corruption may be transformed into less threatening political issues. Opponents within the bureaucracy, police, prosecutor, other courts and parliament may use a number of tactics to

postpone discussion, referring an item for further research or amendment which ensures that the corruption issue will not immediately be acted upon,

Invoking action on a corruption claim requires an ongoing contestation by claims- makers seeking to affect legal and political change. While scientific support and media attention continues to constitute an important part of the claims package, the corruption issues are principally contested within the arena of politics. Contesting corruption within political policy stream is a fine art, given the cross pressures which police, prosecutor, court bureaucrats, and parliament face.

Consider the variety of conflicting interests, which must be navigated by Mr. Yudhoyono as he declared his anti-corruption policy during the presidential election campaign. If he does too little to eradicate corruption, the public will not trust him and he will lose a future election but if he is too stringent in combating corruption, his colleagues, and the business lobby will strenuously object.

It is possible to identify six factors which are necessary for the successful construction of the corruption problem in Indonesia.

First, corruption allegations must have scientific authority or evidence for and validation of their claims. Evidence may be a “reliable friend” to the anti-corruption movement. It is virtually impossible for allegations of corruption to be successfully transformed into indicted corruption without evidence or a body of data, which come from documents, testimonies from witnesses, experts, and pasties,

Second, it is crucial to have one or more scientific “popularizers” who can transform what would otherwise be a fascinating but esoteric piece of research into proactive corruption claims. In some cases, there are some “popularizers™ such as Romli Atmasasmita (Forum 2004), Teten Masduki (ICW), Yusuf Rizal (Blora Center), and Todung Mulya Lubis (TI-Indonesia). Whatever their background, these popularizers assume the role of a community group leader, reframing and packaging claims so that they appeal to editors, journalists, political leaders and other opinion makers.

Third, the suspected corruption must receive media attention so that the relevance of the claim is “framed” as both real and important. This has been the case for most the well-known corruption case such as the General Election Commission and Ministry Religion cases.

Fourth, the alleged corruption must be dramatized in dramatic symbolic and visual terms. For example, the KPK arrests of the governor, the head of the General Election Commission, and TimTasTipikor arrests of the former Minister of Religion. These images provided a kind of cognitive shortcut compressing multiple arguments into one, which were easily comprehensible and ethically stimulating to deter other officials.

Fifth, there must be visible economic incentives for taking action on corruption. The government must increase compensation for civil servants, military personnel and police. Take-home pay should be increased. .

Finally, corruption to be fully and successfully combated there should be an institutional sponsor who can ensure both legitimacy and continuity. The president, KPK, and TimTasTipikor can serve as sponsors.

## 5. CONCLUSION

Since efforts to combat corruption have been promoted by the president, there has been some progress against corruption and better protection of state funds. In spite of these successes, corruption remains endemic in Indonesia. The crux of the problem lies in the nature of the interests that have captured, appropriated, and ensconced themselves in the institutions of state power since the New Order era. From that standpoint, the lack of real progress in eradicating corruption thus far is not entirely surprising. The main problem is that corruption is a complex feature of Indonesian culture, and it is best described in terms of reducing political will or necessary institution per se. Yudhoyono is starting to eradicate the interests that were active during the Suharto era as well as during the intermediate post-Suharto years. Yudhoyono is trying to establish an effective system of checks and balances as well as new institutions imperative for public scrutiny and accountability.

Old entrenched interests remain predominant in the judiciary, police, military, political parties, parliaments, and civilian bureaucracy, as well as in the business community. Furthermore, such interests can be expected to have a stake in keeping monitoring institutions weak and in safeguarding the conditions that make possible the plundering of state coffers and the forging of illicit alliances with business.

Although the kind of social groups with genuine vested interest in transparency, accountability, and the eradication of KKN remain relatively marginal and comparatively disorganized, they have gradually gain a vocal word voice. Although reforming existing institutions remains important, real progress in combating corruption ultimately depends on the ability of reformist interests to organize coherently, to confront political life, and to forge new, more effective cooperation with the judiciary, government, parliament, anti-corruption institutions, religious organizations and practices, Finally, compensation for civil servants should be increased in order to eradicate corruption in state institutions.

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- [<sup>xii</sup>] Kompas, July 29, 2008
- [<sup>xiii</sup>] Komapas, July 29, 2005
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- [<sup>xi</sup>] Sornits Times, August 26, 2000
- [<sup>xii</sup>] Kompas, June 24, 2003
- [<sup>xiii</sup>]\_Kompas, February 8, 2005
- [<sup>xiv</sup>]\_Science and Technology Policy 22 ISTECS Jowrnal Vol. VIIU2006
- [<sup>xix</sup>] Sunday Times, April 21, 2002
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- [<sup>xxiii</sup>] Kompat, October 28, 2004
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- [<sup>xxvii</sup>] Kompas March, 29 2005
- [<sup>xxviii</sup>] Kompas, March 10, 2005.
- [<sup>xxix</sup>] Media Indonesia, March 21, 2005
- [<sup>xxxx</sup>] Kompas, September, 2001
- [<sup>xxxxi</sup>] ww.w.bpk. go.id
- [<sup>xxxxii</sup>]Articte 23F, the 1945 Constitution wew.w.ppatk go.id
- [<sup>xxxxiii</sup>] ww.w ppatk go.id
- [<sup>xxxxiv</sup>] Kompas, March 13,2004
- [<sup>xxxxv</sup>] w.vew.ppatk.go.id/
- [<sup>xxxxvi</sup>] Kompas, July 28, 2005
- [<sup>xxxxvii</sup>] Kompas, July 27, 2005.
- [<sup>xxxxviii</sup>] Kompas, Avgust 3, 2005.

- [xxxxix] Kompas, August 5, 2005
- [li] Article 3 and 4, Law No. 20., 2002
- [lii] Article 6 and 7, Law No. 30, 2002
- [liii] Kompas, December 12, 2004
- [liv} Suara Merdeka, April 9, 2005
- [liv] Suara Pembaharuan, September 12, 2005
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